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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff and Respondent, ) 
vs. ) Case No. 87-0406-CA 
DONALD CARLTON SHAMBLIN, ) 
Defendant and Appellant. ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW: 
I. JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal in this matter 
pursuant to U.C.A., 1953, §78-2a-3 (2) (c) (Repl Vol. 9, 1987 ed.) and 
Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
II. NATURE AND PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal following a jury verdict in Washington County 
Ninth Circuit Court Criminal Case No. 872001526 finding Defendant 
guilty of Count I, Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, a Class B 
Misdemeanor, and Court II, Possession of a Controlled Substance, a 
Class B Misdemeanor. 
At the trial of this matter, held August 28, 1987, evidence was 
introduced which had been obtained in a search of the vehicle the 
M25/1 
Appellant was driving immediately prior to his arrest. Tha 
evidence was received over Appellant's objection that the search c 
the vehicle and seizure of the evidence violated his rights agains 
unreasonable search and seizure as protected by the Fourth Amendmen 
to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of th 
Utah State Constitution. A Motion to Suppress had been filed on o 
about the 31st day of July, 1987. The matter was heard on the 18t 
of August, 1987, and then the balance of the hearing was continue 
until Thursday, August 27, 1987. Following the presentation o 
evidence and argument at the Suppression Hearing, the Trial Cour 
denied the Motion to Suppress. 
After trial, Defendant waived time prior to sentencing and wa 
sentenced at that time. The Notice of Appeal was filed Septembe 
15, 1987, with an Application for Certificate of Probable Cause 
That application was denied by the Circuit Court on September 16 
1987, without hearing. On the 10th day of October, 1987, Appellan 
filed an Application for Certificate of Probable Cause with th 
Court of Appeals. That application was granted. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTFD FOR REVIEW 
1* Whether an inventory search of Appellant's vehicl 
following an arrest for driving under the influence of alcoho 
violated Appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizur 
as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United State 
Constitution where the law enforcement agency with which the office 
was employed had no standardized departmental policy or procedur 
concerning the manner of conducting an inventory search; the manner 
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of conducting the inventory search, including the decision whether 
or not to open closed containers, was left entirely to the 
discretion of the officer conducting the inventory search. 
2. Whether an inventory search of Appellant's vehicle 
following an arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol 
violated Appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure 
as guaranteed by Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution 
where the law enforcement agency with which the officer was employed 
had no standardized departmental policy or procedure concerning the 
manner of conducting the inventory search; the manner of conducting 
the inventory search, including whether or not to open closed 
containers, was left entirely to the discretion of the officer 
conducting the inventory search* 
3. Whether Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State 
Constitution requires that the law enforcement officer conducting an 
inventory search of an impounded vehicle allow the owner of the 
vehicle an opportunity to secure valuables located in the vehicle 
before conducting the inventory search and whether the scope of a 
reasonable inventory search of an impounded vehicle pursuant to 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution is exceeded if 
the officer conducting the search opens closed containers located in 
the vehicle where the officer has no articulable reason to believe 
that the closed container contains anything that is either dangerous 
or evidence of illegal conduct. 
4. Should the State have been permitted to introduce 
statements made by Appellant, at the time of his arrest, concerning 
-3-
the amount of an alcoholic beverage he had consumed when withou 
presenting evidence relating that specific amount of alcohol to th< 
issues before the jury. 
5. Should a witness acknowledged by the Court as an expert ii 
the chemical analysis of marijuana be permitted to testify, in th< 
form of an opinion, that the odor emitted from a "pipe" is that o 
burnt marijuana where the only evidence concerning that witness1! 
qualifications to render such an opinion was his unexplaine< 
acknowledgement that he was familiar with the odor of burrr 
marijuana. 
6. Whether the Trial Courtfs instruction to the jury regarding 
the term "reasonable doubt" denied Appellant a fair trial. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
CONSIDERED DETERMINATIVE 
Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution 
Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution 
Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution 
Article I, Section 7, Utah State Constitution 
Article I, Section 14, Utah State Constitution 
U.C.A. §76-1-501(1) 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a jury verdict finding Defendant guilt] 
of driving under the influence of alcohol, a Class B Misdemeanor 
and possession of a controlled substance, marijuana, a Class ] 
Misdemeanor. The facts relevant to the issues presented for review 
are: 
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On April 15, 1987, Appellant was arrested for driving under the 
influence of alcohol (Transcript of Trial at 18) . Trooper James D. 
Lloyd of the Utah Highway Patrol observed a North American Van Line 
truck traveling North on I 15 drive past the Port of Entry without 
stopping. (Transcript of Trial at 19) . Trooper Lloyd pursued the 
vehicle and it stopped at mile post 3, approximately two miles North 
of the Port of Entry (Transcript of Trial at 20) • Trooper Lloyd 
did not notice anything unusual about the vehicle's driving pattern, 
although Trooper Lloyd had the vehicle continually in his sight from 
the Port of Entry until the vehicle stopped (2 miles) (Transcript of 
Trial at 48 and 49) . Trooper Lloyd spoke with Appellant and 
instructed him to return to the Port of Entry via the Bloomington 
exit. During that conversation, Appellant remained in the truck and 
Trooper Lloyd stood on the ground beside the driverfs door, 3-4 feet 
away from Appellant (Transcript of Trial at 31) . Trooper Lloyd did 
not detect the odor of an alcoholic beverage at that time and 
Appellant's speech was "good." (Transcript of Trial at 49). 
Appellant drove past the Bloomington Exit, located about 3/4 mile 
North of where the initial stop occurred. After Appellant missed 
that exit, Trooper Lloyd pursued the vehicle and stopped it at 
approximately mile post 6. At that time, Trooper Lloyd asked 
Appellant to get out of the vehicle and, as he did so, the officer 
detected an odor of alcohol from Appellant's breath (Transcript of 
Trial at 21 and 22) . Field Sobriety tests were performed and, 
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according to the officer's testimony, Appellant failed three of th< 
five (Transcript of Trial at 23-25). Following completion of th< 
Field Sobriety tests, Trooper Lloyd placed Appellant under arres^ 
for driving under the influence (Transcript of trial at 23-25) 
Appellant was identified at trial as the driver of the vehicl< 
(Transcript of Trial at 25). 
After Appellant was transported to the jail, an intoxilyze: 
test was administered to Appellant (Transcript of Trial at 28). Th< 
results of that test were admitted at trial over defense counsel1! 
objection (Transcript of Trial at 34) . The written report of th< 
intoxilyzer test result was admitted into evidence as Plaintiff1! 
Exhibit 2. That report indicated a blood alcohol content of .1: 
(Record at 74). 
Officer Lloyd interviewed the Defendant after the intoxilyze: 
test (Transcript of Trial at 35-36) . The officer asked Appellan-
how much he had been drinking. Over defense counsel's objectio: 
based on relevance and the prejudicial impact of the testimony 
Officer Lloyd was permitted to testify that Appellant told him h< 
had consumed a "six-pack" of beer (Transcript of Trial at 3 8). 
Trooper Lloyd performed a search of the immediate cab area o 
the vehicle at the time of the arrest (Transcript of trial at 39) 
After Appellant was transported to the County Jail, Trooper Lloy< 
returned and started the inventory at about 10:08 p.m. (Transcrip* 
of Trial at 39) . While Trooper Lloyd was away from the vehicle 
Deputy Sheriff Reg Browne remained with the vehicle. He was there 
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when Trooper Lloyd returned (Transcript of Trial at 40) . However, 
Trooper Lloyd did not know (1) whether Officer Brown had ever gone 
into the cab while Trooper Lloyd was away, or (2) if he had left the 
area of the cab for enough of a period of time that would have 
allowed someone else to get into the vehicle (Transcript of trial at 
46-47). Trooper Lloyd was away from the vehicle for over 26 minutes 
(See Record at 75, intoxilyzer checklist, and Transcript of Trial 
at 39). 
Prior to doing the inventory search of the interior of the 
vehicle Appellant was driving, Trooper Lloyd determined that there 
were no other individuals in the vehicle other than Appellant 
(Transcript of trial at 40)• 
Before beginning the inventory search, Trooper Lloyd asked 
Appellant if he had any cash, jewelry, gold or anything of excess 
value in the vehicle. Appellant replied that he did not (Transcript 
of August 18, 1987, hearing, at 6, 7). However, Trooper Lloyd did 
not ask Appellant what his desires were with reference to securing 
any property in the vehicle prior to conducting the inventory search 
(Transcript of August 18, 1987, hearing at 16). Trooper Lloyd used 
a standard inventory form for conducting the inventory. On that 
form he noted some of the contents of the vehicle. A copy of the 
inventory sheet was admitted as Defendant's Exhibit No. 2 at the 
August 18, 1987, hearing (See Record at 62). During the inventory 
search Trooper Lloyd found a small red bag containing what he 
identified as a pipe, a bong and a plastic bag containing a green 
leafy substance (Transcript of trial at 41, 42). The red bag was 
"zippered" (Transcript of August 18, 1987, hearing at 9). The 
officer testified that he believed that the bag in which the red 
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zippered bag was located was zippered shut as well (Transcript of 
August 18, 1987, hearing at 20). That bag was located in the 
sleeper compartment of the cab behind the driver's seat (Transcript 
of trial at 41) . 
It is the departmental policy of the Utah State Highway Patrol 
to conduct an inventory search of vehicles to be impounded for 
D.U.I.!s by that agency, according to testimony presented by Trooper 
Lloyd. The policy provides that: 
When a vehicle is taken to any police parking lot, impound 
lot or to any commercial storage lot, a written inventory 
shall be made of the contents of the vehicle. Such record 
shall become a part of the case file. When custody of the 
vehicle changes from one person to another, the person 
taking custody of the vehicle shall also assume custody of 
the contents by placing his signature on the inventory 
list. (See Defendant's Exhibit 1 introduced at the 
Suppression Hearing, Record at 55-56) 
Trooper Lloyd was aware of no other written guidelines or directive! 
expressing a departmental policy concerning the inventory search o 
impounded vehicles (Transcript of August 18, 1987, hearing, at 15). 
An unwritten policy of the Utah State Highway Patrol, accordin 
to Trooper Lloyd, was to allow a person "responsible for the vehicl 
[who is] immediately available [to] come and take possession of th 
vehicle." If there were no persons responsible for the vehicle 
then the vehicle would be impounded (Transcript of August 18, 1987 
hearing at 6). The Officers1 practice, in inventorying items in a 
impounded vehicle, although not specifically established I 
departmental policy, was only to list those items of "'excess value, 
There was no departmental policy that outlined whether or not itei 
of non-excess value should be left out of the inventory list. Th< 
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decision was left to the discretion of the officer conducting the 
inventory search (Transcript of hearing of August 18, 1987, at 9, 
10) . 
At the time of this inventory search there was no written Utah 
Highway Patrol departmental policy specifying when the inventory 
search was to be conducted after the vehicle was seized (Transcript 
of August 18, 1987, hearing at 15). Trooper Lloyd's normal practice 
was to conduct the inventory search before the vehicle was delivered 
to the impound yard (Transcript of August 18, 1987, hearing at 16). 
While Trooper Lloyd listed the contents of some containers 
located in the vehicle, contents of some of the containers were not 
separately examined or listed. The contents of a blue suitcase were 
listed as "clothes" (Transcript of August 18, 1987, hearing at 20). 
Trooper Lloyd did not inventory the contents of a black tool kit 
(Transcript of August 18, 1987, hearing at 22). Trooper Lloyd's 
decision whether or not to inventory specific items located within 
the vehicle was not based on any standardized departmental policy or 
procedure but was based on his own personal policy when he did an 
inventory search. There was no standardized departmental policy 
specifying whether or not a zippered container should be inventoried 
as a container or should be opened and the contents separately 
inventoried. That decision was left entirely to the discretion of 
the officer conducting the inventory (Transcript of August 18, 1987, 
hearing at 23) 
The Appellant never gave permission to Trooper Lloyd to search 
the vehicle (Transcript of August 18, 1987, hearing at 24). There 
was nothing about the arrest that led Trooper Lloyd to believe that 
-9-
there were any controlled substances located within the vehicl 
(Transcript of August 18, 1987, hearing at 24). All items obtaine 
during the inventory search were returned to the Appellant with th 
exception of the evidence seized by the officer (Transcript o 
August 27, 1987, hearing at 12 (The Transcript, incorrectl 
identifying the date of that hearing as August 19, 1987, is found i 
the Record at page 136)). 
The green leafy substance found by Trooper Lloyd was identifie 
by witness Dennis Rogers as marijuana (Transcript of Trial at 81) 
Mr. Rogers indicated that a bong is commonly used to smoke marijuan 
and that the pipe found by Trooper Lloyd would be used for the sam 
purpose (Transcript of trial at 82). Mr. Rogers testified, ove 
defense counsel's objection, that the odor emanating from the pip 
was that of burnt marijuana (Transcript of trial at 83). Mr. Roger 
testified that the odor emanating from the "bong11, Plaintiff 
Exhibit No. 7, was also that of burnt marijuana (Transcript of tria 
at 84). 
No testimony was presented at trial to establish Mr. Roger1 
qualifications to testify concerning the odor of marijuana excep 
his acknowledgement that he was familiar with the smell of burn 
marijuana (Transcript of trial at 82). 
Appellant did not testify. 
After evidence had been presented at trial the court instructe 
the jury. The Court instructed the Jury, over defense counsel1 
objection, on the issue of reasonable doubt as follows: 
Before you give up your presumption that the Defendant is 
innocent, you must make sure you are strongly convinced 
that he did the acts he is accused of, and that you do not 
have a reasonable doubt about it. 
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A reasonable doubt is the kind of doubt that would stop a 
person with common sense from making an important decision 
in his or her own life. 
Notice when I say you should be strongly convinced and net 
have a reasonable doubt, I am not saying you have to be 
100% certain. Use your common sense about this. Nothing 
in life is absolutely certain. However, this doesn't 
stop us from making important decisions in our own lives. 
All we can ask of you is to be as certain as you would 
want to be if you were making an important decision in 
your own life (Record at 85). 
The Defendant had submitted to the Court the following 
instruction on reasonable doubt. The Court refused to give that 
instruction. 
By reasonable doubt is made a doubt based on reason, and 
which is reasonable in view of all of the evidence; and 
if, after an impartial consideration and comparison of all 
the evidence in the case, you can candidly say that you 
are not satisfied of the Defendant's guilt, you have a 
reasonable doubt; but if, after such impartial 
consideration and comparison of all the evidence, you can 
truthfully say that you have an abiding conviction of the 
Defendant's guilt, such as you would be willing to act 
upon in more weighty and important matters relating to 
your own affairs, you have no reasonable doubt. It must 
be a real, substantial doubt, and not one that is merely 
possible or imaginary. It should come to the mind 
spontaneously, and should fairly, naturally, and 
reasonably arise out of the evidence as given in the case 
(Record at 37) . 
Following the presentation of evidence, closing arguments by 
counsel and the final instructions by the Court the Jury retired to 
deliberate and returned with a verdict of guilty on both counts of 
the information: Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, a Class B 
Misdemeanor and Possession of Marijuana, a Class B Misdemeanor. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that inventory searches of 
impounded automobiles are searches for constitutional purposes 
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which are not per se unreasonable if conducted within appropriat* 
limitations. However/ one of the elements to be considered i] 
determining whether or not the inventory search was conducted withi] 
appropriate limitations is to determine whether standardize< 
departmental policies and procedures were followed by the la) 
enforcement agency conducting the inventory search. In thii 
instance there were no departmental policies with reference to th< 
inventory. The manner of conducting the inventory, includin< 
whether or not to open closed containers, was left entirely to th< 
discretion of the police officer. That practice was specifically 
disapproved by the U.S. Supreme Court. In light of the lack o 
departmental policy concerning the manner of conducting tin 
inventory, the evidence obtained in the inventory search should hav< 
been suppressed as the result of a per se unreasonable search am 
seizure. 
There is no specific guideline in the State of Utah wit] 
reference to application of Article I Section 14 to an automobil< 
inventory search, but even if the federal standard were held t< 
apply to the State Constitution, this inventory search wa. 
unreasonable. However, this Court's decisions interpreting Article 
I, Section 14 of the State Constitution have specificaLly recognize< 
the individual's right of privacy. When balanced against th< 
legitimate state interest justifying inventory searches, that righ 
of privacy mandates that the individual be afforded the opportunit; 
to secure his own property and requires that an inventory search b< 
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limited in scope to accomplish the legitimate purposes of an 
inventory? the search should not be expanded to authorize 
unnecessary intrusions into the individual's expectation of privacy 
with reference to closed, sealed, locked or zippered containers. 
The Trial Court's permitting testimony regarding the amount of 
alcohol the Appellant claimed to have consumed at the time of his 
arrest without requiring some additional testimony so as to 
establish the relevance of that testimony was unduly prejudicial to 
the Appellant. Certainly the prosecution may introduce voluntary 
statements made by an accused at the time of his arrest which are 
preceded by Miranda warnings. In this case, statements made by 
Appellant that he had consumed an alcoholic beverage were certainly 
relevant. However/ nothing is added to the establishment of facts 
material to a determination of the issues presented if statements 
concerning a specific quantity of alcohol consumed are introduced 
unless there is testimony offered by the State relating the quantity 
consumed to the issues before the jury i.e. blood alcohol content or 
ability to safely drive. The State should be required to present 
evidence that would relate the statement concerning a specific 
amount consumed to those issues as a prerequisite to the 
admissibility of that statement. 
A witness's statement that he was familiar with the odor of 
burnt marijuana should not be sufficient foundation to permit the 
witness to testify as to his opinion regarding the odor emanating 
from a specific exhibit introduced at trial. In this case, Dennis 
Rogers was not qualified as an expert in the detecting of the odor 
of marijuana and no foundation was offered for hie testimony on that 
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issue as a lay witness. Without further foundation, Mr. Roger 
should not have been permitted to offer that opinion. 
In this instance the Trial Court instructed the Jury wit 
reference to the issue of reasonable doubt. That instructio 
misstated the standard of proof in a criminal case. The instructio 
very conceivably could lead a jury to believe that they need not b 
100% certain that proof beyond a reasonable doubt had bee 
established. The instruction reduced the threshold of proof tha 
must be presented in a criminal case, denying Appellant's rights t 
due process of law. 
The evidence obtained as a result of the inventory search o 
the vehicle Appellant was driving should have been suppressed an 
Appellant's conviction for possession of marijuana should b 
reversed. The testimony concerning the perceived odor of the bon 
and pipe and the amount of alcohol Appellant claimed to hav 
consumed unduly prejudiced the Appellant, requiring appropriat 
instructions to the Trial Court upon remand for a new trial 
Finally, the instruction en reasonable doubt denied Appellant a fai 
trial mandating that this case be remanded for a trial consisten 
with due process. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
A. THE INVENTORY SEARCH OF APPELLANT'S VEHICLE WAS PER S 
UNREASONABLE, IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S 
CONSTITUTION, SINCE THE MANNER OF CONDUCTING THE SEARCH WAS NO 
PURSUANT TO STANDARDIZED DEPARTMENTAL PROCEDURE BUT WAS LEF 
ENTIRELY TO THE DISCRETION OF THE OFFICER CONDUCTING THE SEARCH. 
An inventory of an impounded automobile by law enforcemen 
officers is a search. (See Colorado v. Bertinc, 479 U.S. , 93 
L. Ed. 2d. 739, 107 S. Ct. (1987)). Whether the inventor 
search is reasonable, as required by the Fourth Amendment to th 
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United States Constitution, depends on a number of factors: (1) 
the vehicle must be impounded or otherwise in lawful police custody§ 
(See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 49 L. Ed. 2d. 1000, 96 
S. Ct, 3092 (1976)); (2) the inventory search cannot be a pretext 
for an investigative search (See South Dakota v. Opperman); (3) the 
inventory must be conducted according to standardized criteria, (See 
Bertine 93 L. Ed. 2d. at 747, note 6); and (4) the standardized 
criteria must not vest the police officers with discretion to 
determine the scope of the inventory search (See Bertine 93 L. Ed. 
2d. at 748, concurring opinion). As long as these conditions are 
met, the Supreme Court has held an inventory search to be 
reasonable. The reverse is also implicit in the holdings — if 
these standards are not met, the inventory search is unreasonable. 
In Bertine, at page 747, in a footnote to the majority opinion 
written by Justice Rehnguist, the nature of the departmental policy 
which is required is discussed: 
We emphasize that, in this case, the trial court 
found that the police department's procedures mandated the 
opening of closed containers and the listing of their 
contents. Our decisions have always adhered to the 
requirement that inventories be conducted according to 
standardized criteria. See Lafayette, 462 U.S., at 648, 
77 L. Ed. 2d. 65, 103 S. Ct. 2605; Opperman, 428 U.S., at 
374-375, 49 L. Ed. 2d. 1000, 96 S. Ct. 3092. 
In a separate concurring opinion, joined by Justice Powell and 
Justice O'Connor, Justice Blackmun also emphasizes the need for 
standard procedures to avoid the possibility of discretionary action 
by the searching officer. 
The Court today holds that police officers may open 
closed containers while conducting a routine inventory 
search of an impounded vehicle. I join the Court's 
opinion, but write separately to underscore the importance 
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of having such inventories conducted only pursuant to 
standardized police procedures. The underlying rationale 
for allowing an inventory exception to the Fourth 
Amendment warrant rule is that police officers are not 
vested with discretion to determine the scope of the 
inventory search. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 US 
364, 382-383, 49 L. Ed. 2d. 1000, 96 S. Ct. 3092 (1976) 
(Powell, J., concurring). This absence of discretion 
ensures that inventory searches will not be used as a 
purposeful and general means of discovering evidence of 
crime. Thus, it is permissible for police officers to 
open closed containers in an inventory search only if they 
are following standard police procedures that mandate the 
opening of such containers in every impounded vehicle. 
Id. at 748, 749. 
Again, in Bertine at 749 and 750, the same point is emphasize 
in the dissent by Justices Marshall and Brennan: 
In assessing the reasonableness of searches conducted in 
limited situations such as these, where we do not require 
probable cause or a warrant, we have consistently 
emphasized the need for such set procedures: 
"standardless and unconstrained discretion is the evil the 
Court has discerned when in previous cases it has insisted 
that the discretion of the official in the field be 
circumscribed, at least to some extent." Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 US 648, 661, 59 L. Ed. 2d. 6760, 99 S. Ct. 
1392 (1979). See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 US 
266, 270, 37 L. Ed. 2d. 596, 93 S. Ct. 2535 (1973); Cady 
v. Dombrowski, 413 US 433, 433, 37 L. Ed. 2d. 706, 93 S. 
Ct. 2523 (1973); Harris v. United States, 390 US 234, 235, 
19 L. Ed. 2d. 1067, 88 S. Ct. 992 (1968); Camara v 
Municipal Court, 387 US 523, 532-533, 18 L. Ed. 2d. 930, 
87 S. Ct. 1727 (1967) . 
The existence of a written, detailed standardized departmenta 
policy regarding the procedures to be followed in conducting a 
inventory search of an impounded vehicle is basic to the standard 
for reasonableness which have evolved in the cases. In each case i 
which the Supreme Court has held that an inventory search i 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution, th 
existence of a standardized departmental policy is discussed. Tb 
holdings presume the existence of such a policy and base thei 
conclusions thereon. 
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Without a standardized departmental policy, two and probably 
three of the four standards listed above are not met. 1) The law 
enforcement department does not have an established procedure and 
form for conducting an inventory search; 2) no established 
procedure was followed because none existed; and 3) the inventory 
search may very likely be a mere pretext for an investigative search 
because its scope is discretionary with the impounding officer. If 
the inventory is a mere pretext for an evidentiary search, then it 
clearly is not allowed under either the state or federal 
constitutions . 
In Bertinef the Supreme Court upheld the search of a closed 
backpack which was found in an impounded vehicle during a 
warrantless inventory search. In doing so, the Court held that if 
the police were following a standardized procedure and had not acted 
in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation; the search 
did not violate the fourth amendment of the federal constitution. 
However, in the case before the Court, the requirements for a 
reasonable inventory search were not met in two major respects: (1) 
The local Utah Highway Patrol had no stated or defined procedures 
which they were to follow in conducting an inventory search. The 
policy manual (General Order No. 83-10, rev. Jan. 1986) merely 
states that when a vehicle is impounded, "a written inventory shall 
be made of the contents of the vehicle." A form is provided, but 
there are no instructions regarding closed containers found in the 
vehicle. An officer is left totally to his own discretion to 
selectively determine how thorough his search should be. (2) The 
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officer's search has the appearance of an investigative searc 
rather than an inventory search. The inventory lists items i 
selective detail, itemizing alleged contraband, but not specifyin 
other individual items of value located in the vehicle. If th 
search had been truly an inventory search, valuable items would hav 
received primary focus, and the officer would not have had th 
option of listing some things in detail and omitting other items 
The contents of the "tool box" would have been the subject of 
detailed inventory and would not have been inventoried as a tool be 
without inventorying the contents. 
Because the standards for reasonableness set forth by th 
Supreme Court were not met in the instant case, the search was pe 
se unreasonable. A standardized departmental procedure is required 
In Appellant's case, the extent of the inventory search was totall 
subject to the searching officer's discretion in the absence of 
standardized departmental policy defining piocedures to be followe 
in performing the inventory search. The Untied States Supreme Cour 
has emphasized that vesting the officer with the discretion t 
determine the scope of the inventory search must be avoided if sue 
a search is to be reasonable. The evidence seized in this case mus 
be suppressed as the fruit of an unreasonable search, in violatic 
of Appellant's Constitutional rights as protected by the Fourt 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
B. THE INVENTORY SEARCH OF APPELLANT'S VEHICLE WAS PER S 
UNREASONABLE, IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S RIGHT OF PRIVACY I 
PROTECTED BY ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTIC 
WHERE HE WAS NOT OFFERED THE ALTERNATIVE OF SECURING HIS PROPERTY I 
HIMSELF AND THE SCOPE OF THE SEARCH WENT BEYOND THE SCOPE NECESSAI 
TO ACCOMPLISH THE PURPOSES OF A LEGITIMATE INVENTORY SEARCH. 
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Article If Section 14, of the Utah State Constitution protects 
against unreasonable search and seizure as an improper invasion of 
privacy. The language of that Constitutional provision is 
essentially the same as the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. In light of the similarity in the language of the 
State and Federal Constitution, as they relate to unreasonable 
search and seizure, the Utah standard for reasonableness of an 
inventory search should be at least as protective of the 
individual's right of privacy as is the Federal Constitution. (See 
Section A, above). However, this State's interest in protecting the 
right of privacy of its citizens requires that the person whose 
vehicle is to be searched be given an opportunity to make his own 
arrangements to secure property located in the vehicle and the scope 
of the inventory search should be limited to listing closed 
containers, in which a greater expectation of privacy exists, as 
closed containers. 
Assuming that the impounding of the vehicle is proper, a 
warrantless inventory search may be made of the vehicle if the 
search meets the constitutional requirement of "reasonableness." 
It is also well established that an inventory search 
constitutes an exception to the warrant requirement. A 
v/arrantless search of an impounded vehicle for the 
purposes of protecting the police and public from danger, 
avoiding police liability for lost or stolen property, and 
protecting the owner's property is permitted by the fourth 
Amendment and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State 
Constitution. 
Because inventories promote such important interests 
and are not investigatory in purpose, they do not implicate 
"the interests which are protected when searches are 
conditioned on warrants." Therefore, inventory searches 
are not per se unreasonable within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 14. Contraband or 
other evidence of crime discovered in a true inventory 
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search may be seized without a warrant and introduced into 
evidence at trial. State of Utah v. Hygh 711 P. 2d 264, 
265 (Utah, 1985). 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Criscola, 444 P. 2d 517, a 
p. 51S, (Utah, 1968) states the reasonableness test as follows: 
The essential thing is to keep within the reasonable 
middle ground, between the protecting of the law-abiding 
citizenry from high handed or officious intrusions into 
their private affairs; and the imposing of undue 
restrictions upon conscientious officers doing their duty 
in the investigation of crime. It was undoubtedly in an 
awareness of the desirability of avoiding the difficulty 
just mentioned that the language of the Fourth Amendment 
does not denounce all searches, but only those which are 
!
'unreasonable.n Citing Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 
364; Cooper v. State of Calif., 386 U.S. 58; and Brinegar 
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160. 
The Court, in the same case, defined the test of "reasonableness" a 
follows: 
The question to be answered is whether under the 
circumstances the search or seizure is one which 
fair-minded persons, knowing the facts, and giving due 
consideration to the rights and interests of the public, 
as well as to those of the suspect, would judge to be an 
unreasonable or oppressive intrusion against the latter!s 
rights. Ibid. 
The majority of the courts considering the reasonableness of a 
inventory search incident to the impounding of a vehicle have liste 
certain standards which must be met. Universally these standard 
require that the vehicle be legally impounded, and the inventory no 
be a pretext for an investigatory search. Apparently recognizin 
the difficulty inherent in determining whether an inventory is 
pretext for investigation, the Courts have almost universall 
required that the manner of conducting the inventory be pursuant t 
a standardized departmental procedure and not left to the officer1 
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discretion. Since even standardized departmental procedures can be 
unconstitutional (See State v Jewell, 338 So. 2d. 633 (La 1976)) so 
most Courts have also discussed the permissible scope of the 
inventory search even if there is a standardized departmental 
procedure for conducting the inventory search. These cases which 
have discussed the reasonableness of inventory searches require that 
the officer conducting the search adhere to the standardized 
procedure. 
At the very least, this Court should require that the officer 
conducting the inventory search adhere to a standardized procedure 
which defines the scope of the inventory search. However, this 
Court should determine that, independent of the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 14, of the Utah 
State Constitution protects against unreasonable inventory searches. 
1. The person having custody of a vehicle prior to its 
impoundment and the inventory search of its contents should be given 
the opportunity to secure the contents contained in the vehicle as a 
prerequisite to a reasonable inventory search. 
This Court could adopt the Federal guidelines with reference to 
inventory searches. However, in light of the protection afforded 
the individual's privacy rights by Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
State Constitution, the Utah State Constitution should be 
interpreted independently from Federal guidelines. Decisions from 
other states, whether interpreting their own or the Federal 
Constitution, provide some guidance in reaching that independent 
determination of reasonableness under our State Constitution. 
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Many state courts have addressed the reasonableness of 
inventory searches. Many of those cases were decided based on 
Federal Constitutional grounds. However, some have been 
specifically decided on a state's specific constitution as it 
protects its citizens right of privacy. 
In the state of Montana, the Constitution specifically protects 
the individual right of privacy. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of 
that State has held that Fourth Amendment analysis is not 
determinative and, in that State, inventory searches of impounded 
vehicles are limited to articles in plain view from outside the 
vehicle. If the owner is present, he is the adequate judge of the 
treatment of his property and his desires must be considered. State 
v. Sawyer, 571 P.2d 1131 (Mont. 1977). 
The Louisiana State Constitution prohibits unreasonable search 
and seizure and invasion of privacy. The Louisiana Supreme Court, ir 
State v. Jewell, 338 So. 2d. 633 (LA 1976), after discussing the 
Federal standard concerning reasonableness of inventory searches, 
concluded that a necessary prerequisite to a reasonable inventory 
search in the State of Louisiana is the requirement that the law 
enforcement agency conducting the search first allow the owner of 
the vehicle an opportunity to secure his own property,. That Court 
acknowledged that standardized departmental policies and procedures 
are essential to the reasonableness of an inventory search, but also 
reasoned that "unconstitutional searches cannot be 
constitutionalized by standardizing them as part of normal police 
practice." 338 So.2d. at 640. See also State v. Pome, 354 So.2d. 
504 (LA 1978). 
-22-
In both Montana and Louisiana, the State Constitutions 
specifically protect an individual's right of privacy. Accordingly, 
one might argue that the Constitution in those States goes beyond 
the protection afforded by the Federal Constitution. While that may 
be true, the rational of the Supreme Court in each of those states 
is consistent with prior decisions of this Court recognizing a 
constitutionally protected right of privacy in the State of Utah. 
While many decisions of this Court have determined that the 
individuals right of privacy was not violated by a given search, 
this Court has consistently recognized that the individual in the 
State of Utah has a constitutionally protected right of privacy.) 
See, for example, State v. Hatcher, 495 P.2d. 1259 (Utah 1972); 
State v. Schreve, 667 P.2d. 590 (Utah 1983). 
While the states of Montana and Louisiana have Constitutions 
which specifically protect the right of privacy, other states have 
Constitutions which are, for the most part, the same as Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution. The decisions of those 
states v/ith reference to the reasonableness of an inventory search 
provide some valuable guidelines in assessing what standard this 
Court should adopt with reference to the reasonableness of inventory 
searches under the Utah State Constitution and whether or not 
Trooper Lloydfs conduct in this case violated that standard of 
reasonableness. 
In Oregon, the Constitution prohibits any law that would 
violate the law of the people to be secure in their effects against 
unreasonable search or seizure. The Supreme Court of Oregon has 
held that a policy of inventorying the contents of an impounded 
vehicle is not inherently unreasonable if the prescribed procedures 
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comply with the following conditions: 
"A. The vehicle must be lawfully impounded . . . and 
B. ...[the] inventory must be conducted pursuant to a 
properly authorized administrative program, designed am 
systematically administered so that the inventory involves n< 
exercise of discretion by the law enforcement person directing 
taking the inventory." State v. Atkinson, 688 P.2d. 832 a-
836-837 (OR 1984). 
In State v. Mangold, 414 A.2d. 1312 (N.J. 1980), the Supreim 
Court of the State of New Jersey determined that, in the absence o 
a search warranty or indications of criminality, law enforcemen 
officials must afford one an opportunity to remove possessions froi 
an impounded vehicle before conducting an inventory of its contents 
Absent consent or alternative security provisions, an inventory ma" 
not be undertaken in that State; the vehicle owner is presumed t< 
have assumed the risk for any claims of property loss or thef 
arising from the impoundment if the search is not permitted 
Accordingly, the results of an inventory search in that case wen 
suppressed although impoundment was proper and the inventory was i 
accordance with standard police departmental procedure. The Suprem 
Court of Louisiana stated in that case: 
If in fact the principal justifications for an inventory 
are to protect the property and the vehicle and to shield 
the authorities from false claims relating to those items, 
it would seem only reasonable to consult with the owner or 
temporary custodian of the vehicle when he is present at 
the time of the search. Id. at 1317. 
From the foregoing cases, some general principles can b 
gleaned. The over-riding message of those cases is that th 
inventory search should be conducted consistent with its purpose 
The purpose of an inventory search as acknowledged by this Court i 
State v. Johnson, 60 Utah at Reports 30 (Utah, June 30, 1987) 
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decided under Federal Constitutional grounds, are to (1) protect an 
owner's property while he is in the custody of the police; (2) 
insure against claims of lost, stolen or vandalized property; and 
(3) protect police officers from danger. Applying the 
reasonableness standard to the accomplishment of each of those 
purposes, an inventory search of an impounded vehicle must, in 
addition to being conducted pursuant to standardized departmental 
procedure specifying the manner in which the inventory search is to 
be conducted, require that the officer allow the owner of the 
vehicle to make alternative arrangements to secure the contents of 
the vehicle. 
If the purpose of the inventory is to protect the property of 
the individual whose vehicle has been impounded, then clearly, that 
individual should be afforded an opportunity to secure the property 
himself. As the Supreme Court did in the case of State v. Mangold, 
this Court can and should determine that if the owner of the vehicle 
does not consent to the search or make arrangements to secure 
possessions in the impounded vehicle, he is presumed to have assumed 
the risk for any claims of property loss or theft arising from the 
impoundment. This Court's specifying such a presumption would 
obviate the need for a detailed inventory search against the owner's 
will in order to insure against claims of lost, stolen or vandalized 
property. 
2. Closed containers should not be opened and the contents 
separately inventoried absent articulable suspicion that the 
contents, if left unexamined, would create a danger to those 
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impounding the container or that the contents are evidence o 
illegal conduct. 
In State v. Daniel, 589 P.2d. 408 (Alaska 1979), the Alask, 
Supreme Court acknowledged that Article I, Section 14 of the Alask. 
Constitution contains an even broader guarantee against unreasonable 
searches and seizures than is found in its Federal counterpart 
Article I, Section 14 of the Alaska Constitution protects the righ 
of the people to be secure in their "other property" as well a 
those items enumerated in the Fourth Amendment to the United State 
Constitution. Having concluded that the right of privacy guarantee 
to Alaskan citizens is broader in scope than that guaranteed in th 
Federal Constitution, the Supreme Court of Alaska went on to discus 
whether or not the police, as a matter of routine inventor 
procedure, are entitled to search closed, locked or sealed luggage 
containers, or packages contained within the vehicle whose content 
are being inventoried. The Supreme Court of Alaska concluded that 
"Protection of the interiors of closed luggage, brief cases 
containers and packages transported in the vehicle reflect 
fundamental expectations ot privacy which Alaska society woul 
recognize as reasonable." Id. at 416. Because of that greate 
expectation of privacy in closed containers, the Alaska Suprem 
Court concluded that, "A warrantless inventory search of closed 
locked or sealed luggage, containers or packages contained within 
vehicle is unreasonable and thus an unconstitutional search unde 
the Alaska Constitution." Id. at 417-418. 
In State v. McDougal, 228 N.W. 2d. 671 (Wis. 1975), the Suprem 
Court of Wisconsin reasoned, without specifying whether they were 
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addressing the issue under the Federal or the State Constitution, 
that the object sought to be achieved by the inventory search, that 
is, protection of the police from claims of theft and protection of 
the Defendant's property, do not usually require an inspection of 
closed suitcases and containers. In State v. Prober, 297 N.W. 2d. 1 
(Wis. 1980) , the Supreme Court of that State again cited both the 
Federal and the State Constitutions without specifying under which 
standard the case was decided. In that particular case, the Court 
determined that a purse in the trunk of the vehicle should not have 
been opened and searched. The Court stated that "the purpose of 
inventory can be adequately served by inventorying a container as a 
closed unit." Id. at 7. The Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin 
has determined that, in balance, the greater expectation of privacy 
in a closed or a sealed container found inside a vehicle justifies 
inventorying that container as a closed container. To inventory the 
item as such i.e., list a tool box as a tool box, does not 
significantly interfere with the government's need to protect itself 
against claims for loss of property. 
Some cases which have decided the reasonableness of an 
inventory search were clearly based on Federal Constitutional 
standard. However, the rational of the Courts in those cases 
merits consideration even in light of recent Federal cases which 
might be considered contrary to those State Court decisions. The 
reasonableness of the rational in these cases is no less now than 
before Opperman and Bertine. 
The State of Washington in State v. Houser, 622 P.2d. 1218 
(Washington 1980), concluded that, "An inventory search may not be 
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unlimited in scope. The direction and extent of such searches mus 
be restricted to effectuating the purposes which justify thei 
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment." 622 P.2d. at 1225 
Accordingly, the inventory search should be "limited to protecting 
against substantial risks to property in the vehicle and no 
enlarged on the basis of remote risks." The Court therefore 
concluded that it was unnecessary to open a locked trunk an< 
an inventory search that included unlocking and examining 
the contents of the trunk was unreasonable. The Court went on t< 
discuss whether or not a closed toiletry kit should have bee 
inventoried as a unit. While it is true that the Washington Suprem 
Court's analysis of that issue predates Bertine and was based i 
substantial part on prior U.S. Supreme Court cases interpreting th 
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, the balancing of interest 
rational applied by the Washington Supreme Court is still a vali 
approach to the issue. In that case, the Washington Supreme Cour 
concluded that the balancing of the governmental and societa 
interests of an inventory search as previously recognized by tha 
Court against the citizens1 interest in the privacy of persona 
luggage requires that a closed piece of luggage not be opened an 
searched unless "the police have reason to believe a container hold 
instrumentalities which would be dangerous even when sitting idly i 
the police locker." 622 P.2d. at 1228. In those instances, th 
police may, and should search the contents of the container. Th 
Washington Supreme Court cited with approval the case of People v 
Counterman, 556 P.2d. 481 (Colorado 1976). That decision, based i 
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part on the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado State Constitution concluded 
that a knapsack which did not give any indication that its contents 
were dangerous or particularly valuable and in need of special 
inventory should not have been opened and the contents examined. 
The legitimate purposes of the inventory search could have been 
fully accomplished by merely noting the item as a sealed knapsack. 
Id. at 485. 
This Court should determine that closed containers be 
inventoried as closed containers in the absence of an articulated 
suspicion that the closed container contains something that is 
dangerous or illegal. 
In this case, the officer conducted a detailed inventory of 
some packages and listed other packages without specifying the 
contents. Obviously, Trooper Lloyd was not concerned that the 
purposes of the inventory search would not be fulfilled if he failed 
to list the contents of the tool box. Just as he need not list the 
contents of the tool box, he need not have listed the contents of 
the shaving satchel or the blue zippered bag in which the shaving 
satchel was located. There is simply no need to rifle through the 
contents of closed containers in order to perform an inventory 
search, except as a pretext to search for evidence, especially 
where, as here, the owner denied that there was anything of "excess 
value" located in the vehicle. In this particular instance, the 
Appellant was asked if he had any property of excess value. He 
stated that he did not. In light of that statement, Trooper Lloyd's 
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inventory search should not have gone beyond listing items in th 
truck. Closed containers should not have been opened and searched. 
This Court should adopt, as a standard of reasonableness o 
inventory search under the Utah State Constitution, the requiremen 
that the officer conducting the search allow the owner of th 
vehicle to take reasonable measures to secure his own property and 
if any inventory search of the contents of a vehicle is undertaken 
the scope should be limited to inventorying and listing close 
containers as such without opening the containers and riflin 
through the contents. An individual's right of privacy whe 
balanced against the State"s interest in conducting an inventor 
search might give way where containers are listed as such. However 
the right of privacy in a zippered shaving satchel located i 
another zippered container is so obvious that, in the absence of a 
articulated suspicion that the satchel contains evidence of a crim 
or something that creates a danger if left unexamined, that privac 
interest clearly outweighs the governmental interest in conductin 
inventory searches. 
C. APPELLANT'S ADMISSION TO HAVING CONSUMED A SPECIFIC AKOUN 
OF AN ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED ABSENT COMPETEN 
EVIDENCE RELATING THAT AMOUNT OF ALCOHOL TO THE APPELLANT'S ABILIT 
TO SAFELY OPERATE A MOTOR VEHICLE OR HIS BLOOD ALCOHOL CONTENT. 
The Appellant's admission at the time of his arrest that he ha 
consumed alcohol was clearly admissible in this case. (See Rul 
801, Utah Rules of Evidence.) However, his statement concerning th 
amount consumed, even though an admission, is not admissible withou 
appropriate evidence to relate that amount consumed to the issue 
before the trier of fact. All evidence, even admissicns by parties 
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should be balance against the standards established by Rules 401 and 
403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Rule 401 defines relevant 
evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of 
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence." However, even relevant evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is "substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury . . ." 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
In this particular instance, the issue is whether a witness's 
statement as to the precise amount of the alcohol he had consumed 
should be excluded pursuant to Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence unless the party offering that statement introduces proof 
to establish the relevance of the amount of alcohol claimed to have 
been consumed. 
In conjunction with competent expert testimony relating the 
amount of alcohol claimed to have been consumed to the relevant 
issues in a trial for driving under the influence of alcohol, the 
3ury would not be unfairly prejudiced, confused ox misled if an 
amount consumed is specified. However, introducing the unqualified 
statement that an individual had consumed a "six-pack" serves no 
purpose, in the absence of evidence relating that amount of alcohol 
to the issues before the Court. Evidence that a "six-pack" was 
consumed with nothing more is unduly prejudicial. The Trial Court 
in this case should have required the State to present expert 
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testimony relating the consumption of a "six-pack" of beer to bloc 
alcohol content or ability to safely operate a motor vehicle. 
D. TESTIMONY THAT A WITNESS IS "FAMILIAR WITH THE ODOR 0 
BURNED MARIJUANA" IS NOT SUFFICIENT FOUNDATION TO SUPPORT THA 
WITNESS'S TESTIMONY THAT A SPECIFIC EXHIBIT HAS THE ODOR OF BURN 
MARIJUANA. 
In order for a witness to offer an opinion at trial, tha 
individual must either have been qualified as an expert to render a 
opinion on that issue (Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence) or, if h 
cannot testify as an expert, the testimony must be "rationally base 
on the perception of the witness and helpful to a clea 
understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact i 
issue." (Rule 701, Utah Rules of Evidence). In this instance 
Dennis Rogers was qualified as an expert on the issue of th 
chemical analysis of marijuana. He was not qualified as an exper 
on identifying the odor of burnt marijuana. He merely stated tha 
he was familiar with that odor. The prosecution did not present an 
evidence as to how the officer obtained that familiarity nor did th 
State lay any other foundation that would allow the judge to asses 
the qualifications of that witness to so testily or allow the jur 
to decide whether the opinion should be given any weight. The Tria 
Court completely glossed over the requirements of foundation fc 
that type of an opinion and allowed the officer to testify with r 
more qualification than that he was familiar with the odor of burr 
marijuana. In the event this matter is remanded for trial and tl" 
evidence about which Dennis Rogers testified is not suppressed, tl" 
Trial Court should be instructed to require, as a minimum, that tl" 
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State establish Mr. Roger's qualifications to identify that specific 
odor. 
E. THE TRIAL COURT'S DEFINITION OF THE TERM "REASONABLE 
DOUBT," AS READ TO THE JURY, MISSTATES THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN A 
CRIMINAL TRIAL. 
In State v. McCune, 51 P. 818 (Utah 1898) the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
A reasonable doubt is not a a mere imaginary, cautious, or 
possible doubt, but a fair doubt, based upon reason and 
common sense, and growing out of the testimony in the 
case. It is such a doubt as will leave the juror's mind, 
after a careful examination of all the evidence, in such a 
condition that he cannot say that he has an abiding 
conviction, to a moral certainty, of the Defendant's 
guilt. 51 P. 818 at 819 
In State v. Williamson, 62 P. 1022 (Utah 1900) the Utah Supreme 
Court cited the above language in the McCune case as a "very 
satisfactory and comprehensive definition of reasonable doubt." (62 
P. 1022 at 1024). The Court, in the Williamson case, was called 
upon to decide whether an instruction on reasonable doubt violated 
the Defendant's right to a fair trial. The Court considered the 
following instruction: "[Reasonable doubt] means such a doubt as 
would cause a prudent man to pause and hesitate before accepting as 
true and acting upon any matter alleged and charged in the graver 
and important affairs of life." In commenting on that instruction 
the Court acknowledged that while the instruction concerning 
reasonable doubt, taken as a whole, was correct, that portion quoted 
had been criticized. The Court then went on to state: "It is not 
advisable to enlarge upon or enter into details in giving the 
definition of reasonable doubt. A doubt is a fluctuation or 
uncertainty of the mind arising from defect of knowledge or of 
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evidence; and a doubt of the guilt of the accused party, honestl] 
entertained from the evidence, is a reasonable doubt." (62 P.102; 
at 1024) 
In State v. Neel, 65 P. 494 (Utah 1901) there is a slighi 
variation of the definition of reasonable doubt set forth in McCun* 
and Williamson. In the Neel case the Court instructed the jury a* 
follows: 
By a reasonable doubt is meant a doubt based on reason, 
and which is reasonable in view of all the evidence; and 
if, after an impartial consideration and comparison of all 
the evidence in the case, you can candidly say that you 
are not satisfied of the Defendant's guilt, you have a 
reasonable doubt; but if, after such impartial 
consideration and comparison of all the evidence, you can 
truthfully say that you have an abiding conviction of the 
Defendant's guilt, such as you would be willing to act 
upon in more weighty and important matters relating to 
your own affairs, you have no reasonable doubt* It must 
be a real, substantial doubt, and not one that is merely 
possible or imaginary. It should come to the mind 
spontaneously, and should fairly, naturally, and 
reasonably arise out of the evidence as given in the case. 
65 P. 494 at 495. 
This definition of reasonable doubt substantially conforms t< 
the McCune and Williamson definitions. However, the Court went o; 
to acknowledge that: 
It is very probable that the part of the instruction as 
given by the Court defining a reasonable doubt as being 
'such as you would be willing to act upon the more weighty 
and important affairs relating to your own affairs' would, 
if standing alone, have been of questionable sufficiency, 
yet, whether correct or not, it could do no harm with the 
aid of, and in connection with, other parts of that and 
other instructions given on that subject. 65 P. 494 at 
495 
The Supreme Court concluded its statement concerning reasonabl 
doubt by commenting that persons capable of being jurors ar 
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supposed to know what a reasonable doubt is without an analytical 
explanation. Jurors axe presumed to have common sense and to 
understand the English language. If a juror cannot understand his 
or her duty when instructed that they should not convict when they 
have a reasonable doubt of the prisoner1 s guilt, they will "seldom 
get any assistance from such subtleties as require a trained 
classical mind to distinguish." (65 P. 494 at 495) 
The McCune reasonable doubt instruction has been quoted with 
approval by the Utah Supreme Court as recently as 1977 in the case 
of State v. Brooks, 563 P2d. 799 (Utah 1977). 
The instruction submitted by defense counsel but rejected by 
the Trial Court is the instruction on reasonable doubt approved by 
the Utah Supreme Court in the Neel case. 
The instruction proposed by defense counsel complies with the 
decisions of the Utah Supreme Court and would have been appropriate 
under the circumstances. 
Despite defense counsel's request, the Trial Court instructed 
the jury on the issue of reasonable doubt as follows: 
15. Before you give up your presumption that the 
Defendant is innocent, you must make sure you are strongly 
convinced he did the acts he is accused of, and that you 
do not have a reasonable doubt about it. 
16. A reasonable doubt is the kind of doubt that would 
stop a person with common sense from making an important 
decision in his or her own life. 
Notice when I say you should be strongly convinced 
and not have a reasonable doubt, I am not saying you have 
to be 100% certain. Use your common sense about this. 
Nothing in life is absolutely certain. However, this 
doesn't stop us from making important decisions in our own 
lives. All we can ask of you is to be as certain as you 
would want to be if you were making an important decision 
in your own life. 
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The Circuit Court instructed the jury that they need only be 
"strongly convinced" and less than "100% certain." These phrases ii 
the charge to the jury require reversal for two reasons: 1) The 
Court misstated the law and 2) the Court's instruction would lead c 
jury to believe that they could convict if less than 100% certaii 
that the Defendant were guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The minimum level of proof required to convict in a criminal 
case is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (UCA § 76-1-501(1)). The 
Court's charge instructed the jury that something less than 100-
certainty that that threshold had been met would suffice. Thai 
implies that something less than proof beyond a reasonable doubi 
would warrant conviction; that is not the law. 
The Supreme Court has approved the term "abiding conviction tc 
a moral certainty of the Defendant's guilt" as the equivalent o: 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (51 P. 818 at 819) An "abidin< 
conviction" is something far different than "strongly convinced. 
"Strongly convinced" implies that "convinced" is measured on 
continuum and that "strongly," wherever that lies on the continuum 
is sufficient to convict. However, "convince" means: 
"to overcome or subdue, and, in logic, to satisfy the mind 
by proof. If evidence is convincing, in any case, it is 
sufficient, and to say it ought to be more convincing [or 
less] in one case than in another, is giving the word 
degrees of comparison which it does not possess, the word 
itself being the superlative" Ballentine's Law Dictionary, 
Bancroft-Whitney Co., San Francisco, California 1969 at 
page 270. 
"Strongly convinced" is something entirely different tha 
"convinced" and has never been approved in this State as th 
standard by which a jury is to judge the guilt or innocence of 
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person. Either the jury has a reasonable doubt or not. The term 
"strongly convinced" has no place in a jury instruction on 
reasonable doubt. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has specifically 
approved the term "to a moral certainty" as the equivalent of beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Less than 100% certain is not the same. The 
instruction of the Circuit Court would lead the jury to believe that 
something less than moral certainty will do. The Court erred in 
giving that instruction to the jury. 
Finally, the Court incorrectly instructed the jury that they 
need be only so certain as they would want to be if making "an 
important decision" in the juror's own life. The terms "more 
important affairs of life" and "matters of highest concern and 
importance" and "most important interests" have all been approved 
when used in the context of defining reasonable doubt, (75 AmJur 2d. 
Trials § 835 at 728) , and the phrase "more weighty and important 
matters" was permitted with reservations in State v. Neel, (65 P. 
494 at 495) . The term "an important decision in your own life" has 
not. In fact, the term "important transactions of life" has been 
specifically disapproved by Courts in ether jurisdictions. (75 AmJur 
2d. Trials § 835 at 727, 728) 
The instruction proposed by defense counsel correctly states 
the law in the State of Utah concerning the term "reasonable doubt." 
The instruction provided by the Circuit Court contradicts prior 
decisions of the Utah Supreme Court which couch proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt in terms of "abiding conviction" and "moral 
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certainty." By telling the jury that they need only be "strongl 
convinced" and that they need not be "1CC% certain" the Court mislei 
the jury as to their duty in this criminal case. The convictio 
which followed violated Defendant's right to a fair trial a 
provided by law and to due process of lav; as guaranteed by the Fift 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution an 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah State Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
Pegardless of whether this Court decides this issue unde 
Federal Constitutional grounds or adopts an independent Stat 
Constitutional basis for reviewing the reasonableness of automobil 
inventory searches, the inventory search in this case wa 
unreasonable. The officer's unbridled discretion to open and searc 
the contents of some containers and list other containers as sue 
without inventorying their contents renders the inventory search pe 
se unreasonable. The Appellant's conviction for possession o 
marijuana should be reversed, the evidence which foirmed the basi 
for that conviction having been the result of an unreasonable searc 
and seizure in violation of Appellant's Federal and Stat 
Constitutional rights. 
In the event the items seized in the inventory search c 
the vehicle which Appellant was driving are not suppressed, the 
this case should, at the very least, be remanded for a new trie 
with instructions to the Trial Court to require adequate foundatic 
prior to allowing the testimony of either an expert or a lay perse 
identifying the odor emanating from the "pipe" or "bong" offered a 
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exhibits at trial. This Court should additionally require that the 
State introduce evidence relating Appellant's statements concerning 
the amount of alcohol consumed to the issues before the Trier of 
Fact as a prerequisite to the introduction of any evidence, 
including statements by the Appellant, as to the precise amount of 
alcohol consumed. Finally, this Court should remand, with 
instructions to the Trial Court, to properly instruct the jury on 
the issue of reasonable doubt. The jury in a criminal case must be 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt. Anything less than that denies 
a criminal defendant due process of law. 
DATED this '/^ day of [Lp ^ , 1987. 
GALLIAN & WESTFALL 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copy of the 
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day oJ
Paul F. Graf 
Washington County Attorney 
220 North 200 East 
St. George, UT 84770 
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ADDENDUM 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the 
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution: 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of laws. 
Section 7. 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of lav;. 
Section 14. 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall 
not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause 
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
M25/1/42 
Utah Code Annotated §76-1-501, 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to b< 
innocent until each element of the offense charged against him i, 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, th( 
defendant shall be acquitted. 
M25/1/42 
Instruction No. 14 
WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR TRYING TO CONVINCE THE JURY THAT THE 
DEFENDANT DID THE ACTS HE (OR SHE) IS ACCUSED OF? 
Because the state (or city) is the party making the 
accusations in this case, it has the responsibility to try to 
persuade the jury that the defendant is guilty. 
According to our law, the defendant is presumed to be 
innocent until proven guilty. Therefore, the defendant or 
his (her) lawyer do not have to try to convince you the 
defendant is innocent. You must start by presuming it. 
Instruction No. 15 
HOW CONVINCED SHOULD THE JURY BE BEFORE DECIDING THE DEFENDANT 
IS GUILTY? 
Before you give up your presumption the defendant is 
innocent, you must make sure you are strongly convinced he did 
the acts he is accused of, and that you do not have a 
reasonable doubt about it. 
Instruction No. 16 
WHAT IS A REASONABLE DOUBT? 
A reasonable doubt is the kind of doubt that would stop 
a person with common sense from making an important decision 
in his or her own life. 
Notice when I say you should be strongly convinced and 
not have a reasonable doubt, I am not saying you have to be 
100% certain. Use your common sense about this. Nothing in 
life is absolutely certain. However, this doesn't stop us 
from making important decisions in our own lives. All we can 
ask of you is to be as certain as you would want to be if you 
were making an important decision in your own life. 
(Testimony from witnesses is presented) 
GALLIAN & WESTFALL 
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Jury Instruction in the above-entitled matter. 
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document was hand delivered this ^ day of August, 1987, to: 
W. Brent Langston 
Deputy Washington County Attorney 
220 North 200 East 
St. George, UT 84770 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
By reasonable doubt is meant a doubt based on reason, and which 
is reasonble in view of all the evidence; and if, after an impartial 
consideration and comparison of all the evidence in the* case, you 
can candidly say that you are not satisfied of the Defendant's 
guilt, you have a reasonable doubt; but if, after such impartial 
consideration and comparison of all the evidence, you can truthfully 
say that you have an abiding conviction of the Defendant's guilt, 
such as you would be willing to act upon in more weighty and 
important ....matters relating to your own affairs, you have no 
reasonable doubt. It must be a real, substantial doubt, and not one 
that is merely possible or imaginary. It should come to the mind 
spontaneously, and should fairly, naturally, and reasonably arise 
out of the evidence as given in the case. 
